qui tacet consentire videtur

They had me at the synopsis. I was instantly intrigued by 女王の教室 and it’s implications to education:

Akutsu-sensei accomplished this feat by introducing a test-based rank and privilege system on the first day. The highest scorers on the Monday morning test get their choice of seats and other perks while the two lowest scorers are burdened with all the chores for the week from blackboard and toilet cleaning to serving lunch. When the students protest her system and call it unfair, she tells them to open their eyes. In Japanese society, she lectures, those who work hard or have influence get all the privileges, and the lazy or less affluent end up with the leftovers. She says only six in 100 people can expect to be happy and the elite already have most of the advantages and access to the best medical care. She tells them that, as products of the public school system, they will have to scramble to get anything at all, and most of them will end up as “bonjin” (ordinary people), to whom those on the top will be happy to leave the soldiering and service-sector jobs.

I wonder if I might have been better motivated to excel earlier if my primary school teachers had instituted such a system that directly links performance to lifestyle instead of the diffuse, indirect and somewhat opaque system of ’streaming’ that most 6th graders don’t fully appreciate. One might say that our supposedly ‘unforgiving’ education system in Singapore isn’t nearly unforgiving enough to create an effective feedback mechanism to the most important stakeholder - the student - and create buy-in.

There is some moral ambiguity in the drama series about whether or not it is right for Akutsu-sensei to put her young wards through a gauntlet of social and moral dilemmas, even if they are meant to strengthen their personal development and internalize integrity. It just isn’t very clear whether or not that is the intent, or whether that intent justifies the hell her students are put through. Hell isn’t too far from the mark, as Akutsu-sensei meets most literary parallels to the Devil from the medieval morality plays and later works: she is omniscient (knows all the students’ transgressions), omnipresent (appears everywhere she is needed), omnipotent (at least relative to the 6th graders). Ultimately, the life lessons she teaches are important and meaningful, and she teaches them effectively, though indirectly. On the question of the justness of her methodology, I am undecided as to how much intent should be a factor.

All things considered, Jyoou no Kyoushitsu is probably one of the best J-dramas of 2005, along with Nobuta wo Produce and Byakuyakou. I highly recommend it. For lighter fare, try Hana Yori Dango or Densha Otoko.

First off, just-turned-21 Chris notes a certain substitutability between ‘beauty’ and ‘brains’ while also including some signal-strength mechanisms as the rate of exchange. The simple answer to Chris is that there is no static, binary exchange rate because they do not correlate linearly, if they correlate at all. There is no easy way to see the marginal gain when you add one unit of this and another of that between the two because they often rely on external factors or are codependent etc… And furthermore even if there were, the dynamic nature of the exchange rate would probably shift our expectations accordingly. Which is precisely what is happening, isn’t it Chris?

Compatriot Oikono tries to apply the general equilibrium model to relationship markets, and suggests that markets clear. I would suggest that the general equilibrium model (Arrow-debreu and otherwise, and tweaking it here and there with ’stickiness’/rigidities etc) is probably not the right approach if we’re dealing with a market where the actors strongly deviate from rationality. Information/search costs, signal/noise ratios, externalities etc seem less important when compared to fundamental decision-making biases like satisficing and anchoring/prospect theory. I don’t see convergence to equilibrium or market clearing happening, and I’m not sure that they should either: if we take these as ‘market failures’ we are tempted to allow the state to intervene where it is probably neither competent nor benevolent - the example in the literature is in Brave New World. In Huxley’s novel, relationship markets clear, but it seems like a suboptimal outcome to me.

‘Everyone is unique’ sounds like a contradiction.

Even if beauty is subjective (and down we go the neverending spiral of subjectivity), within a single perspective (that is, subjective to a particular person), you would think that the perspective contains some internally consistent method of valuation. You might decide, based on your own aesthetic values, who is more attractive and who is less. You might assign your own proportional weighted calculations on multiple variables like facial symmetry etc.

What if there were two subjects assigned the same aesthetic value (from different variables)? Would they be equally beautiful, but in different ways? How would a rational person decide between them?

Or perhaps beauty is positional and relative. What if we flew to an imaginary country where people were, by our standards, relatively ugly? Would an observer from that country have adjusted their concept of beauty to a new set point at the median? I think so. Furthermore, without a frame of reference to compare to, one would not be able to put a value on beauty. We could fly to a country where everyone was equally beautiful - but an observer from that country would not be able to distinguish between them either.

This leads me to the pessimistic conclusion that beauty requires ugliness to have meaning. That my wishing that we were all equal in this respect would not be a solution - my best course of action is to go where the median (of guys) is relatively low hence raising my relative value, though mobility may eventually erode all aesthetic differentials, or adjust my own frame of reference accordingly (suboptimal outcome). This may also mean that socialism does not apply well to romance - I suppose Rand might agree in her own way.

Context: In Singapore, ’scholarships’ are contracts offered by various public sector agencies (and some private firms) to sponsor tertiary education that come with (generally six-year) employment obligations. This is probably rather different from the traditional meaning of the term, which refers to the academic quality of a ’scholarly’ individual, or the sponsorship of such an individual. As such, they are not primarily ‘need-based’ or redistributory as per most sponsored tertiary education programs, but employment-centric.

The A-level results are to be released later this afternoon today. I remember the day I got my results - and how all our result slips came with a ‘goodie-bag’ package of scholarship material. Today’s Straits Times came with their Scholars’ Choice special, in which the state agencies take out full page advertisements, and have their scholars interviewed. These ads and interviews also appear in local magazine Career Central. Within the school term there was also a significant emphasis on scholarships, particularly in celebrating those who obtained them. Perhaps it may be useful to take an objective look at scholarships and whether the attention they command in Singapore is warranted.

The value of a scholarship can be derived from the sponsorship amount (tuition fees, expenses etc) and the projected income over the duration of the contract. Then we discount and adjust for (dis)utility to get the present value. Let’s call this value X.

The opportunity cost of X is the next best alternative foregone i.e. not taking up the scholarship, paying for college and working somewhere(s) for the equivalent time frame. The value of this is derived from the projected income, discounted for risk etc to get the present value. Let’s call this value Y.

In an efficient labor market, X and Y must converge and equate. If X is greater than Y i.e. the scholar is ‘overvalued’, the incentive for the sponsor is to reduce income to match productivity/value levels or increase effort/disutility - after all the scholar is ‘captive’. If Y is greater than X i.e. the scholar is ‘undervalued’, then a rational individual would go do something else. An efficient labor market would result in an equilibrium where scholars are correctly matched according to their value.

Of course markets are not fully efficient, and everyone seems to think they can arbitrage between X and Y and come out on top. However, this usually suffers from overvaluation of X and undervaluation of Y. Anecdotal evidence suggests that most scholars would do a lot better elsewhere. Why? More on this later.