Ryusei no Kizuna 流星の絆 Meteor’s bond
I’m liking this short drama a lot. It’s about 60% comedy, 20% drama, 20% mystery, which makes for wonderful pacing, and doesn’t get as heavy as some j-dramas can be. It stars Ms. Death Note, Toda Erika, who is omg just so beautiful. But she’s not why I watch this, I couldn’t keep up with her previous one ‘Code Blue‘ even though it had the pocky idol Aragaki Yui in it as well. Yes, it’s that bad. Anyway. It also has *bleah* boyband star Ninomiya Kazunari, so Arashi playing the OP is par for the course as per all Johnny-associated dramas, and *double bleah* Nishikido Ryo. But they don’t matter. It’s about three siblings that team up to take revenge for their parents’ murder, while also swindling bad people. I guess you could think of it as a winning combination of Kurosagi and Nobuta wo Produce.

Maou 魔王 Devil
Despite being another ‘ikemen paradise’ type drama, I actually liked this one a lot. Stars Ikuta Toma, who performed amazingly in HachiKuro and HanaKimi, and yet another Johnny’s boybander *bleah* Ohno Satoshi. His Arashi compatriot Ninomiya Kazunari had one teeny cameo in the first episode, then disappeared. Though I must admit Arashi did a good job with the OP.

So the drama is supposedly a remake of a k-drama which I never heard of, but it was surprisingly engaging. It is basically a count of monte cristo story (my favorite novel), where the protagonist (?) exacts his revenge on everyone who wronged him in very complicated ways, which is really suspenseful to see play out. I don’t think a Johnny’s boyband kid can really be an Edmond Dantes, but he did well enough. The drama is 50% psychological thriller and 50% Shakespearean tragedy, so it isn’t the most lighthearted thing to watch – it does not have gags interspersed here and there like Kurosagi and Liar Game did, so it has more in common with Byakuyako.

Seigi no Mikata 正義の味方 Ally of Justice
I really liked this one too. It’s about a high schooler and her evil older sister, who forces her to do all kinds of odd things like spy on potential boyfriends. The plot is about how the high schooler tries to get rid of her evil older sister by marrying her off, so she has to fool her sister’s dream guy into thinking she’s wonderful. It’s 100% comedy gold.

Change
Political drama about an unlikely second-generation, popular young politician who somehow becomes prime minister and makes reforms that challenge his party bosses. Basically, its a dramatization of Koizumi’s rise to power. Taking Curtis’s Japanese Politics class this semester made me appreciate this drama a lot more than if I had seen it without learning more about the political institutions and practices it satirizes (like the LDP faction system, bubble-era corruption, hereditary politics…). 75% comedy, 25% West Wing drama, its kind of like Mr Smith Goes to Washington set in Nagatacho.

This drama was amazingly popular this summer, far more than any other drama named above, which suggests that something in it resonates with the Japanese public. I keep wanting to write about this in one of my class papers, but the opportunity just never comes up.

—

So it appears there is something of a k-drama dry spell. It’s been a long while since I’ve seen anything good since Coffee Prince, and even that got old fast. For whatever reason, Korean television dramas aren’t keeping up, which is sad since I am running out of good ones to watch. This isn’t just my opinion. Daily NK reports:

In North Korea, the fervor of the South Korean Waves is on the wane; Korean dramas, which have spearheaded the spread of South Korean culture and progress since 2000, are no longer generating huge interest among North Korean citizens. The prevailing response of the citizens has been “I have seen enough” and “I have had my fill.”

H/T Curtis from NKeconwatch.

Soft power is a strategic priority, so I hope the k-drama dry spell ends soon.

Interesting social science research question: If I am right that J-dramas are more popular, and more successful as cultural exports, Why are tv dramas from Japan better than Korea, Taiwan or Hong Kong? (Singapore isn’t even in the picture… sad) Something to do with market conditions? Structure of the industries? Creative talent? Speech regulations? Culture? I would be interested in pursuing this as a project if it wasn’t so interdisciplinary.

I’ve received some e-mail (fewer than anticipated) asking whether I am still alive, so let this allay your concerns. Some of what has kept me busy since term started are my several writing commitments. One of which is for the Korea Times, in which my essay on globalization, trade and finance has been published in the Nov 1st edition. You can read it here.

Unfortunately, I suppose the ‘headline’ nature of newspaper publishing has truncated my original title: “The Open Door and the Even Hand: Leadership and Risk Management in the Global Economy”. Yeah, its pretty lengthy, but I needed it to make the logical link back to the given topic “Ways to Reduce Risk in the Globalized Financial Market”. Without the original title, I fear my metaphor-heavy concluding paragraph doesn’t make much sense. The organizers never consulted me about truncating the title, otherwise I would have changed it somewhat to retain the metaphor.

This is my second published op-ed, but not a significant improvement in terms of prestige of the newspaper or quality of writing. I am not particularly proud of this essay, the narrative lead-in is crude and the metaphors are forced, and the analysis isn’t particularly insightful. This reflects the amount of time I spent writing it: an all-nighter partly spent reading up on the Korean financial crisis, instead of the relaxed weeklong process I usually take. At its best, my prose is cold fire, as much an art as it is (social) science. At its worst, its a take-home midterm on a topic I care little about, policy wonk regurgitation.

My target is to publish an op-ed in a flagship newspaper: NYT, WSJ, WaPo. I’ll have to think up a strategy to reach that goal.

I’ve attached the article here in case the link to koreatimes.co.kr is down:

Korea Times: Biz/Finance 10-31-2008 20:56
Leadership Key for Risk Management

From the window on the Pyongui line, I caught my first glimpse of Pyongyang, and my first thought was how different this place was from Seoul. Even the train ride here was a far cry from the KTX I took from the APEC summit in Busan. I remember being struck by the sheer dynamism of the city as it celebrated, and was celebrated by, the global economy. The difference with Pyongyang could not be more apparent.

While North Korea chose to close its doors to the outside world, South Korea chose otherwise, and has become Asia’s fourth largest economy. Yet as the U.S. financial crisis sends shockwaves in international capital markets, Iceland and Pakistan near sovereign default, and a looming global recession, openness now seems a liability: Korea faces weakening external demand, rising inflation due to import prices, and a liquidity crunch from foreign capital flight.

This is not the first time Korea has faced global economic instability. Ten years of post-crisis reforms have prepared it to weather the storm ahead. But how well has it learned the lessons of 1997?

A fundamental principle of international economics is the “impossible trinity”: a country cannot have capital mobility, an independent monetary policy, and fixed exchange rates simultaneously. Many Asian countries learned this the hard way in 1997. Yet Korea is trying to have all three in 2008: the economy needs foreign investment, the central bank targets inflation, while the government has intervened in currency markets in both directions.

1997 taught us that successful currency intervention is extremely difficult. The global financial system is too complex for anyone to foresee, let alone manipulate. Government intervention not only drains foreign reserves, it also risks overcorrecting, bad timing, and having unintended consequences. It often does more harm than good.

Given the complexity of the global economy, countries that benefit from international trade and finance must also accept some vulnerability to forces beyond their control. Risk and reward are part and parcel of capitalism. Though we cannot eliminate this risk without unacceptable costs, we can manage risk by strengthening the domestic economy and institutions, preparing it to stand against the tide of the global business cycle.

Korea has prepared well. Early warning systems keep an eye on economic conditions, and its financial institutions are far more robust today: Although some banks have U.S. exposure, their credit ratings are unchanged. Conglomerates have undergone painful restructuring and emerged stronger: for example, Hynix, formed from Hyundai and LG’s semiconductor businesses, was billions in debt after the dotcom crash. Now, it is the sixth largest semiconductor manufacturer.

Yet one variable has been neglected: Small and medium enterprises. 99 percent of businesses, 88 percent of employment and 50 percent of added value in Korea come from small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). But while conglomerates restructured, SMEs were protected by the government and never went through Schumpeter’s “creative destruction.” SME restructuring was merely delayed, and many, which should have adjusted long ago, now face bankruptcy.

The government should help SMEs weather the crisis, but it should not allow this support to be abused. In 1997, leverage and derivatives were the problems. Then, conglomerates over-leveraged with short-term foreign-denominated debt, precipitating the crisis when creditors called. Now SMEs are over-leveraged, with trillions in losses from debt financing through Knock-In Knock-Out (KIKO) derivatives.

Forex options are appropriate for exporters hedging against currency appreciation, or importers against depreciation, but that is not how KIKO options were structured. Instead of covering the downside from currency volatility, KIKO gave firms unlimited downside with limited upside from currency stability ― the opposite of a hedging strategy. Some subscribers were domestic-oriented firms with no direct exposure to currency risk in the first place. It is unclear whether they understood the risks involved or the instrument they bought. If they did, KIKO was a highly speculative bet that the government would intervene to stabilize exchange rates ― it did ― and that it would do so effectively ― it did not. But with the bailout of KIKO losses, they effectively won the bet.

SMEs were not solely responsible: Banks, which sold KIKO contracts, now face a class action lawsuit. There is a clear conflict of interest between their fiduciary duty and sales desk, and their corporate governance needs review. Yet as the government bailout proceeds, it should avoid distorting the market by rewarding misconduct and mismanagement. If good firms are to succeed, we must allow weak firms to fail, and taxpayers should not bear the burden of someone else’s bad decisions.

Risk management in the global economy requires leadership that knows its limitations, and can make the tough decisions to do what is necessary, even if it is politically costly. The open door needs an even hand that is fair to exporters, importers, consumers, investors, and taxpayers alike. Risk management is not easy, but there’s only one alternative to the open door: Just look north.

What prize did I win? A lifetime supply of kdramas, courtesy of mysoju.com. Yup.

1. Asymmetric experience among US-DPRK foreign relations staff
During his visit to Pyongyang, Wit met with people from the ‘Bureau of North American Affairs’ in the DPRK’s foreign affairs ministry, and they were the same people he met with on his previous visit in 1993, their “whole adult careers” had been spent dealing with one country portfolio. He compares this with the Bush administration whose foreign policy appointments excluded many North Korea portfolio-experienced State Department personnel from the start, which I guess may have included Wit, in which case I can understand why he’s a little bitter about it.

2. The state of DPRK nuclear facilities
Is poor, apparently. He showed us photos and described the 5MW reactor structure as a “concrete monster” with broken windows and shoddy construction, and its control room looked like it was “from a 1950s sci-fi movie”. They didn’t even have anti-radiation protective gear, which the team had to bring themselves. Apparently nuclear safety is not a big issue there. Some facilities cannot be maintained by IAEA as they were sealed off due to radioactive waste. The denuclearization process will have to deal with this expensive waste disposal issue somehow.

3. Nuclear scientists and engineers as a special interest group
There are some ~3000 technicians and scientists who need to be redirected to civilian jobs as denuclearization proceeds, but they are highly skilled and trained in a very specialized range of jobs and have a big interest in maintaining the status quo, instead of having to be retrained to do something else since there just aren’t a lot of other opportunities for people with that skill-set there. Other than being a possible stumbling block if not coopted into the process, this is a security problem for the US since highly skilled nuclear scientists can be an asset to its rivals, both existing nuclear powers and those with nuclear ambitions.

But his presentation also had a couple of other interesting factoids and photos:

1. ‘Traffic ladies’ – he described them as ‘beautiful women’ who are also disciplined and tough. It says something about Pyongyang’s infrastructural development and the relative cost of labor to capital to have such a labor intensive transportation management system. Either labor is so cheap that it doesn’t make sense to invest in technology yet, or the infrastructure is still not reliable enough to operate an automated system. On one hand, many developing countries that do not have traffic light infrastructure tend to not have any traffic management at all, so it’s to the DPRK’s credit that they have some system in place, even if it’s probably not a sustainable or scalable one.

2. The ‘Kimjongilia’ begonia (there is also a Kimilsungia orchid) was proudly displayed at the Koryo hotel in full bloom. Apparently it was the great leader’s birthday when Wit visited, which is around the same time as my birthday. It was presented to the great leader by a botanist from Chongryon.

3. The only airline serving Pyongyang is Koryo Airlines, and all their planes are flown by ex-MiG pilots. That may not be a bad thing since fighter jets require lots of intense training to pilot, but it may not be good if the skills are not directly transferable. In any case I would probably feel safer taking the train.

My main takeaway from Hill’s speech was about the logistical difficulty of a truly ‘multilateral’ six party dialog. The opening ceremony had all six participating countries involved, and the Chinese hosts had prepared a special hexagon-shaped table instead of the usual rectangle or round table. Maybe it was good feng shui. In the center of the hexagon were lighted flowers – after one delegate spoke a few sentences, the flowers would light up while each translator worked. Only after each light went out did the delegate continue, and apparently the North Korean translator usually took the longest – which could either mean that they take extra effort at translating every nuance of what is said, or that their translation capabilities are more limited, or maybe both.

Hill’s point was also that a truly multilateral dialog would be logistically difficult, long and tiring due to simultaneous translation lag, and that each delegation broke into bilateral sessions to discuss specifics. The neocon criticism of Hill’s bilateral meetings with the North Korean delegation was thus unfounded – everyone had bilateral meetings with everyone else – but it seems like the beauty of the six party talks is that parties can claim it was both multi and bilateral depending on what suits their interests. His description of the process of the bilateral talks was also intriguing: If the US and the DPRK had some particular issue that could not come to agreement, it would get raised in other bilateral sessions with other parties who would then apply pressure on that particular issue, which sounds like a lot of horse trading.

The usual questions came up about China, Taiwan etc. The moderator ensured that all questions came from students, as the press would get their own time with Hill afterwards during the reception. I came away from it with some regret that I cannot join the State Department, at least not in the near term, and I’ve missed the boat for a fast-track foreign service job with the nationality I do possess. This means that if I do pursue IR academia (it is an option), I will not have an easy transition into policy, which is the main draw of the field and the best strategy to advance within it a la Victor Cha.

In July 2007, the South Korean ministry of finance announced that it had hired the lead actor and actress from a hit television serial that aired May-July to promote their microcredit program. That television serial, “War of Money” (쩐의전쟁), was about the informal moneylending industry in South Korea, reaching an average of 32.8% of households in the greater Seoul area and 31% nationwide, and it was the top-rated serial of the season, so popular that ‘bonus’ episodes were produced – it remains one of my personal all-time favorite kdramas. Much of its storyline emphasized themes of income volatility, uncollateralized credit, innovative entrepreneurship, and good (and bad) borrowing practices – all themes relevant to microfinance. In an interview prior to the serial’s airing, the lead actor Park Shin-yang (박신양, of Lovers in Paris/파리의연인 fame) had even noted that one of the sources of inspiration that he drew from was the work of Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank.

Perhaps it may be useful to take “Money’s Warfare” one step further, and consider a similar application of television serials in microfinance education, through its plot, themes, and product placement strategy.

Advantages & Disadvantages of Television Serials as educational medium
Pros:

Proven consumer education tool
No literacy requirement
Highly scalable
Advertising/product placement synergies

Cons:

Requires infrastructure/television access
Highly variable outcomes
Highly culturally-specific
Target demographic mismatch

Pros
Proven consumer education tool. First, that television is effective for consumer education is well-documented in marketing literature, and more recently studies have analyzed its role in educating viewers on such social issues as gender discrimination. (See among others, Jensen, Robert and Oster, Emily. “The Power of TV: Cable Television and Women’s Status in India.” NBER Working Paper Series No. 13305 August 2007) Television content is in an entertainment format, such as popular soap operas, that reach a broad audience. Even if soap operas are not explicitly intended to impart specific messages for social development (as the Sabido Method of socially-oriented programming performed in Latin America), they still raise viewer awareness of the alternative lifestyles and the implicit social values of those depicted. This can have a tremendous impact on rural, less-educated communities where links with the urban populace are few and far between. If the serial is very successful, the impact will be that much greater: the top 10 soap operas in India attract as many as 50 million viewers a night.

No literary requirement. Second, television as an education medium does not require any literacy on the part of the viewer, unlike newspaper advertising or pamphlets. Considering that the adult literacy rate in rural developing countries is low, the value of this should not be underestimated.

Highly scalable. Third, television serials are highly scalable, as once initial investments in public broadcast radio-wave or satellite/cable infrastructure is in place, the marginal cost of delivery per household is near zero. Serials can also be easily reproduced as VCDs or DVDs and made to suit different languages and regional dialects via dubbing and subtitles. This means that if a television serial is successful in one area, it can be spread to other areas easily via different mechanisms.

Advertising & product placement synergies. Fourth, television serials are also opportunities for marketing of microcredit services, whether overtly through advertising slots or more subtle product placements integrated into the storyline, which I will describe further below. Even with microcredit advertising, there will be space for other advertising as well, and for popular serials, advertising revenue may even cover the cost of production, which means greater sustainability.

Cons
Requires electricity infrastructure & television access. Although this may be a limiting factor to outreach in poorer rural areas, it should be noted that for many poor households, a television set is one of the most important status/aspirational goods, because of the relatively cost-effective entertainment value and escape it provides from a dreary life. Also, televisions are quasi-non-rival-goods since the marginal cost of another person watching at the same time is almost zero (up to a point).

Unfortunately, the educational impact of the serial, which depends on the its popularity, is highly dependent on exogenous factors like the timeslot it airs, the cast, etc. Impact is also highly culturally-specific, if it is intended to be accessible to the audience. Furthermore, most viewers of television serials are middle-class housewives, and not the target clients of microcredit products. Yet these can still be mitigated by an effective marketing strategy and excellent scripting, which I address below.

Possible plot, themes, and characters
Television serials need drama to be successful. I propose a serial about the development of a microfinance institution (MFI), with two overlapping love triangles (a staple of most soap operas and the standard formula in Korean serials). For my purposes I set the drama in mainland China, where audiences are very familiar with K-dramas. The serial’s plot will emphasize themes like:

Uncertainty about the future and employment security
The failure of social safety nets and the welfare system
The high cost of informal moneylenders and poor access to formal financial institutions
The power of entrepreneurs with microloans

The main characters are:

The activist. A brilliant economics student from a poor interior province studying at Tsinghua University, she is forced to drop out to support her ailing parents, whose spiraling healthcare costs are caused by a substandard and corrupt socialized healthcare bureaucracy and the breaking of the ‘iron ricebowl’ of state-owned enterprises and the danwei system. Unable to make ends meet due to the decaying economy of the interior provinces and the politicized nature of the state banks, her father passes away, and she swears vengeance against the corrupt officials and to revive the provincial economy. Will she prevail, or will her enemies destroy her MFI?

The financier down on his luck. The youngest son of a wealthy private equity dynasty, he must prove himself worthy and make his fortune, but he’s just had a string of failures partly due to his pride and hot temper (although he’s actually a nice guy deep down inside). When the activist miraculously saves his life from a triad kidnapping, their fates are entwined, and he takes a chance on her crazy idea about microfinance, which she explains to him (and the audience). Is he falling for her, or just repaying a debt of gratitude? Can he find it in his heart to understand this business, or is he just about the money?

The bureaucrat out to get her. The doctor’s most hated rival in Tsinghua, now a rising star in the state banks due to her family political connections in the Shanghai clique. Set up for an arranged marriage with the financier, she bitterly resents the doctor’s growing presence in his heart and her rise up the social ladder. How far will she go to get what she wants?

The official who loves her. The doctor’s secret admirer from her school days, now a government official in Zhongnanhai. Will he side with the system, or with her? Can he beat the financier in pursuit of her love?

You can probably tell I watch far too many soap operas, probably to make up for the lack of drama in my life. Maybe when I go to China this summer I can pitch this story at CCTV? Or maybe not. I guess television dramas about civil society activism and government corruption might be unpopular with the censors.

Frank’s presentation went through 1) why socialism failed 2) typical patterns of socialist transition 3) transition processes in Europe and 4) transition processes in Asia before it started to get really interesting.

His basic point was that because the transitions in Europe taught that introducing small reforms can lead to a ‘big bang’ change if not managed well, so the transitions in Asia would be the model to be adopted. However, because China and Vietnam were primarily agricultural economies, small relatively-easier reforms in agriculture had a big impact on production, whereas the state industry reforms were much more difficult and took longer. Whereas in North Korea, which does not have the same wealth of agricultural resources and instead has more extractive and manufacturing industries, the transition will be much more difficult and cannot take the same pattern – which means that the success of initial reforms, which is crucial to boosting a reform faction’s position for further reforms, is much more difficult. He also posits that the DPRK leadership had less ideological space to maneuver than China and Vietnam whose parties had reunified the country and were legitimized as much by nationalism as communist ideology.

Frank is fairly optimistic about market reforms, he listed a few of them that most of us are familiar with (street markets, SEZs etc), as well as the flexibility of juche, which I have totally no idea what its about. He had plenty of photos from his visits to NK, such as a FamilyMart in Kaesong, a ‘Banana Republic’ bag on display at a factory (which may suggest that Kaesong firms are either supplying or looking to supply big brand name apparel chains), a poster of a ‘Party Founding Day’ sale, and debit card advertisements. He also told us about a DPRK official who asked him to send economics textbooks over for his daughter studying at KIS, and when asked which language was preferred, apparently it has to be English.

I’m again surprised that it was such a small group that turned up for the talk. This was one of the most entertaining talks of the semester, and you don’t have to be a subject matter expert to appreciate it. In any case, I got plenty of material for my term paper, so hopefully my enjoyment is transferable to work.

He gave a brief background on multilateral v. bilateral trade agreements in general, then a short history of ROK bilateral agreements, to how the KORUS FTA came about. Here are the interesting parts:

Ratification: If it doesn’t pass congress, that would “flush down 50 years of alliance.” He also mentioned Dean Acheson’s defense perimeter exclusion and other historical grievances (Sino-Japanese war). Major opposition to ratification are the US auto unions. Will probably see ratification feb-july 08.

Rice exclusion: He pointed to the Jones Act (which blocks the ROK shipbuilding industry). He noted that agriculture liberalization is a welfare rather than competition issue as most of the farmers are aged.

On the implementation of the FTA: He also had this funny story about beef import rules and how the stipulation for ‘boneless beef’ only (no bovine SRM) means they x-ray every cargo box, and even a tiny bone chip the size of a fingernail means rejection, which has resulted in US beef exporters setting their mechanized slaughterhouses to cut further away from the bone.

On Korean agriculture: He mentioned that when he was studying in the US, his aunt at home sent him a package of specially-prepared kimchi every month since he can’t eat just any kimchi. I wish my mom would send me packages of food, but I think 1) it won’t transport that well, 2) customs might not like it and 3) it’ll be much more expensive than going to Nonya.

Benefits: While it helps keep inflation down for consumers, he says the real gain is to subject all ROK industries (except agriculture) to intense competition.

ROK-Japan: Preliminary negotiations in progress, will officially start with the new administration.

ROK-China: Blocked by agriculture.

Kaesong complex: He mentioned that in the many cases where countries reformed/liberalized, pressures came mostly from within. He didn’t elaborate further on that. He also thinks reunification will come sooner rather than later. A second complex is in the plans, as well as an upgrade of Kaesong. He also noted that DPRK allowed shipbuilders to use East Sea facilities with deeper harbors, which has cut production costs by 40%.

Last semester, the DPRK perm rep to the UN was supposed to come talk at Weatherhead, but I guess in the aftermath of the Minuteman incident they didn’t want that kind of attention. Which is unfortunate, since I was looking forward to it.

Prof. Kim is a Kluge fellow (or I might say, a fellow Kluge perhaps?) at the Library of Congress, and she stated that her presentation was to dispel the stereotype of Kim Jong-il as a madman obsessed with film. She noted that attempting to use psychiatry in understanding foreign policy might not be appropriate in this case. Her argument was that North Korean films function as 1) an efficient political tool, 2) a form of social education, and 3) have evolved dramatically (yes, literally) since the 80s.

Films are efficient political tools for the DPRK because of 1) their easy reproduction and distribution, especially compared to other means of conveying messages to the people. A traveling opera troupe is expensive and cannot penetrate society to the same scale. Films are also 2) a novel medium of communication, since most North Koreans are from the rural countryside and had not been exposed much to movies. More importantly, films are 3) a highly controlled art form, where every film process includes scripting, planning, rehearsals, shooting, editing, to make a final cut for distribution. Other performance art forms have more space for improvisation and are less controllable. Finally, films are generally 4) collective in production and consumption patterns. Since DV cameras and video editing software isn’t widely available in the DPRK, most films will require significant resources to produce.

Prof. Kim noted that because of the above reasons, film was well-established as a political tool in North Korea before Kim Jong-il came to power. The DPRK is the first hereditary socialist country, but prior to the succession it was unclear whether Kim Il-sung would pick his son to take his place, and Kim Jong-il had to prove himself. After seeing how Stalin and Mao’s legacies were treated, the great leader was concerned about his own legacy, and film was one way to immortalize that. Prof. Kim then introduced “Star of Choson” (1980-87), a drama series about the early life of the great leader. Apparently even the actor playing the great leader was revered as a dignitary, that somehow the respect for the subject being played was so great that it was transmitted to the player.

She then played a short clip from the great leader’s state funeral (1994). Everyone was wailing and crying, beating their chests. Even the announcer narrating the video sounded like she was about to burst into tears anytime. Prof Kim argued that this may be partly due to Korean cultural norms on public rituals of lamentation. She suggested that the film may have been to generate buy-in by documenting the mass mourning of the great leader. The next clip was Kim Jong-il’s visit to Russia to meet with Putin in 2001. She asked us to look carefully at his shoes, which were high heeled and added at least two inches to his height. Interestingly, the Russia visit clip was narrated in English, suggesting it was for an international audience. This was just before the nuclear crisis erupted, and DPRK was increasingly isolated internationally, thus the film might be to reaffirm his political activity in world affairs.

Moving on to films as a socializing and educational tool, Prof Kim argued that like any propaganda, films were used to create enemies for society to focus on. She screened a clip from an animated short “Lazy Pig” (1969), which was very Orwellian. It was set in a farmhouse, where the animals are debating about who should be chosen to be served on the Master’s banquet table. Dog was brave and guarded the farm from evil fox, Horse bears heavy loads for the Master, Ox ploughs the fields, but Pig is lazy and only eats tofu and naps, so he has to be sacrificed for the good of the farm. Then the moral of the story is narrated: if you are lazy and selfish, you too will end up on the banquet table. Even animals work diligently for the revolution!

The next two clips were “Choi Hak-sin family” (1966) and “Flower girl” (1972), which present American and Japanese imperialists respectively as evil. In both, women and children were presented as vulnerable victims, since family life is so important in Korea. Choi Hak-sin family actually had a white guy playing the American imperialist GI, I wonder where they found him? Or was he from the Soviet bloc? I have no idea, should’ve asked her about that. Flower girl was less interesting: after the little girl is blinded by the Japanese colonial mistress, her oppa swears revenge and burns down the house, but is caught by the kempetai police and separated from his family forever. Prof Kim notes that these early propaganda films were bland and boring – they were so bad I was laughing – so Kim Jong-il “invited” a filmmaking couple from the South to improve DPRK film standards. I thought her expression when she said “invited” was just so perfect. It was as if you could see the quotation marks floating in the air.

And improve them they did. She screened a clip from “Runaway” (1984), which featured a train blown up by guerillas, except that it wasn’t done by special effects (which would have been obvious in that era of film) but by blowing up a real, functional locomotive. Apparently the dear leader spared no expense for his action movies, even though DPRK transportation infrastructure probably needed that train a lot more than the film.

Prof Kim then screened a clip from their first romantic film, “love, love, my love” (1984), which was a musical based on the Chunhyangga folk story (I like the modern adaptation a lot better). Apparently it was a huge hit and tickets were scalped for exorbitant prices in the black market. I didn’t think it was that great, it was pretty much just a girl in hanbok singing and dancing. The next clip was from “Hong Gil-dong” (1986), which drew a lot from old Hong Kong kungfu movie techniques. The hero was some kind of wandering swordsman flying through the forest killing Japanese ninjas and defeating their pirate boss to save the abducted princess, who he then elopes with, presumably to the North.

The last film she talked about was “Schoolgirl’s Diary” (2006), which unfortunately wasn’t screened at all since we can probably get it on DVD (isn’t video piracy a major export?). Apparently it sold 8 million tickets, which means 1 in every 3 people in the DPRK have seen it, but then again population statistics aren’t too clear. The film’s significance is a bit hard to decipher. It is about an ordinary schoolgirl who is unhappy that her parents are too busy to be with her. Her parents are both scientists working on a project that isn’t explicitly described. Presumably the message is that the revolution is more important than being with your family. This was released two months before the nuclear tests were announced, and Prof Kim suggests that it was to prepare the nation to cheerlead the nuclear policy, but that seems like a bit of a stretch.

I didn’t stay for the Q&A because the talk had taken over an hour with all the clips played, and rushed back to the office. Fortunately there was still a roast beef salad left, and I managed to have lunch. Prof Kim’s talk was pretty interesting and I will probably go for her next one tomorrow on “For the eyes of the Dear Leader: Fashion and body politics in North Korean Visual Arts”. This time I will not bring my suit jacket. I will also be meeting Curtis from NK economy watch tomorrow since I have to go to GMU in the evening for a Koch program workshop.